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Abstract
We provide a first comprehensive account of the dynamics of Eurozone countries from the creation of
the Euro to the Great recession. We model each country as an open economy within a monetary union
and analyze the dynamics of private leverage, fiscal policy and spreads. Our parsimonious model can
replicate the time-series for nominal GDP, employment, and net exports of Eurozone countries between
2000 and 2012. We then ask how periphery countries would have fared with: (i) more conservative
fiscal policies; (ii) macro-prudential tools to control private leverage; (iii) a central bank acting earlier
to limit sovereign spreads; and (iv) the possibility to recoup the competitiveness they lost in the boom.
To perform these counterfactual experiments, we use U.S. states as a control group that did not suﬀer
from a sudden stop. We find that periphery countries could have stabilized their employment if they
had followed more conservative fiscal policies during the boom. This is especially true in Greece. For
Ireland, however, given the size of the private leverage boom, such a policy would have required buying
back almost all of the public debt. Macro-prudential policy would have been helpful, especially in Ireland
and Spain. However, in presence of a spending bias in fiscal rules, macro-prudential policies would have
led to less prudent fiscal policies in the boom. Central bank actions would have stabilized employment
during the bust but not public debt. Finally, if these countries had been able to regain in the bust the
competitiveness they lost in the boom, they would have experienced a shorter and milder recession.
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There is wide disagreement about the nature of the eurozone crisis. Some see the crisis as driven by
fiscal indiscipline and some by fiscal austerity, some emphasize excessive private leverage, while others focus
on external imbalances, sudden stops or competitiveness divergence due to fixed exchange rates. Most
observers understand that all these “usual suspects” have played a role, but do not oﬀer a way to quantify
their respective importance. In this context it is diﬃcult to frame policy prescriptions on macroeconomic
policies and on reforms of the eurozone. Moreover, given the scale of the crisis, understanding the dynamics of
the Eurozone is one of the major challenge for macroeconomics today. We argue that we need a quantitative
framework to identify the various mechanisms and, ultimately, to run counterfactual experiments. The
objective of this paper is to make progress on these fronts. To do this we propose a simple model that
focuses on three types of shocks: household leverage, fiscal policy, interest rate spreads and exports. A
key challenge is then to empirically identify private leverage shocks that are orthogonal to shocks on fiscal
policy and shocks on spreads. To help us identify the eurozone shocks, we use the US as a control. The
US experience is of great use for us because of both its similarities and its diﬀerences with the eurozone
experience.
Figure 1: Employment Rates in Ireland, Arizona, Spain and Florida.
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To illustrate this, we take the example of Arizona and Ireland because their increase in household debt
to income ratio during the boom years were very large and similar. Figure 1 shows the evolutions of the
employment rates, normalized to zero in 2005. The employment boom and bust are almost identical up
to 2010 but diverge afterwards. This suggests that the fundamental mechanisms at work in both regions
were similar up to 2010, but diﬀerent in later years. We argue that the key diﬀerence between Ireland and
Arizona is that Arizona did not experience a sudden stop after 2010. There was no concern on its public
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debt let alone on its remaining in the dollar zone. A similar, although less striking, pattern emerges when
we compare Spain and Florida. Again, divergence is clear after 2010.
A salient feature of the great recession in both the US and the eurozone is that regions that have expe-
rienced the largest swings in household borrowing have also experienced the largest declines in employment
and output. Figure 2 illustrates this feature of the data, by plotting the change in employment during the
credit crunch (2007-2010) against the change in household debt-to-income ratios during the preceding boom
(2003-2007) for the largest US states1 and Eurozone countries.
Figure 2: First Stage of the Great Recession: Household Borrowing predicts Employment Bust in the US
and the EZ
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The American and European cross-sectional experiences look strikingly similar in this respect on the
period 2007-2010. This suggests that the shock faced by these two economies were similar in nature on that
period. Moreover this suggests that the structural parameters that govern the way the economy reacts to a
deleveraging shock may also be similar in the two monetary zones.
The key diﬀerence between the US and the eurozone experience is the sudden stop in capital flows
starting in 2010 in the later. The eurozone stands apart from the US but also historically as we do not know
of any other historical example of a sudden stop among countries or states inside a monetary union although
sudden stops have been frequent in the 19th and 20th centuries (see Accominotti and Eichengreen (2013)).
1State level household debt for the US comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, see Midrigan and Philippon
(2010).
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Figure 3: Second Stage of the Great Recession: Fiscal Imbalances Predict Double Dip in Europe
AZ
CA
FL
IL
MI
NJ
NV
NY
OH
PA
TX
USA
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
AZ CA
FLIL MI NJ NVNY
OHPA
TX
. ... . . ..... .
−.
15
−.
1
−.
05
0
Lo
g−
Ch
an
ge
 E
m
plo
ym
en
t 2
00
7−
20
10
 &
 2
01
0−
20
11
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Change Household Debt−Income Ratio 2001−2007
AUT
BEL
DEU
ESP
FIN
FRA
GRE
IRL
ITA
LUX
NLD
PRT
−.
06
−.
04
−.
02
0
.0
2
D(
Em
pl/
Po
p)
 2
01
0−
20
11
−.04 −.02 0 .02 .04
Chg Transfers/GDP 2003−2008
Contrary to the eurozone, the US states did not experience any shock on spreads in borrowing costs and no
fear an a potential exit of the dollar zone. This allows us, for the eurozone, to identify the part of the private
deleverage dynamics that is not due to the spreads shocks by the private deleveraging predicted in the US
on the period 2008-2012. We call this the “structural” private leverage shock.
Figure 3 illustrates the diﬀerences between the American and European experiences during the later stage
of the recession. Starting in the Spring of 2010, sovereign spreads widen and several European countries find
it diﬃcult to borrow on financial markets. The US and EZ experiences then start to diverge. While US states
grow (slowly) together, eurozone countries experience drastically diﬀerent growth rates and employment. A
state variable that correlates well with labor markets performance in 2010-2011 in the Eurozone is the change
in social transfers during the boom. Eurozone countries where spending on transfers (and also government
expenditures) increased the most from 2003 to 2008 are those that are now experiencing severe recessions in
the later stage. This suggests that in the second stage past fiscal policy, because of its eﬀect on accumulated
debt, had an impact on the economy through spreads and the constraint on fiscal policy it generated after
2010. This is an hypothesis we will analyze.
As noted in Midrigan and Philippon (2010), the pattern of figure 2 is at odds with the predictions of
standard models of financing frictions. Such models predict that a tightening of borrowing constraints at the
household level leads to a decline in consumption but, due to wealth eﬀects, to an increase in the supply of
labor. In this paper, we analyze a model where borrowing limits on “impatient” agents drive consumption,
income, the saving decisions of “patient” agents and employment in small open economies belonging to a
monetary union. We introduce nominal wage rigidities which translate the change of nominal expenditures
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into employment. We first consider the predictions of the model taking as given the observed series for
private debt, fiscal policy and interest rate spreads between 2000 and 2012. This reduced form simulation
reproduces very well what was observed across Eurozone countries both during the boom and the recession
starting in 2008 for employment, nominal GDP, consumption and wages. We then identify structural shocks
for household debt, interest rate spreads and fiscal policy using the US experience to predict the household
debt shock. Finally we feed our model with these structural shocks and run counterfactual experiments on
fiscal policy, macro prudential policies, actions of the central bank to limit spreads and competitiveness.
We first ask how periphery countries would have fared if they had followed more conservative fiscal
policies during the boom than they actually pursued. Such policies would have reduced the spreads and fiscal
austerity during the bust. We find that periphery countries would then have stabilized their employment.
This is especially true for Greece and Ireland, less so for Spain and Portugal. For Ireland however such policy
would have entailed entering the bust with no public debt. This suggests that fiscal policy alone cannot act
as a stabilization tool in presence of a massive private credit boom. We then ask how these countries would
have fared if they had successfully conducted macro-prudential policies to limit private leverage during the
boom. This would have successfully stabilized employment especially in Ireland, in particular because it
would have entailed lower recapitalization during the bust and would have reduced spreads and allowed for
a more countercyclical fiscal policy in the bust. In Spain, we find that given a spending bias in the fiscal
rule they would have substituted public debt to private debt. This suggests that macro-prudential policy
alone in this country would not have successfully stabilized employment in presence of a spending bias in the
fiscal rule. Finally, the sudden stop episode worsened the crisis by further constraining the fiscal reaction of
governments during the bust. In a third counterfactual, we find that if the ECB words and actions (Mario
Draghi’s declaration “Whatever it takes” and the OMT program) had come in 2008 rather than 2012 and
had been successful in reducing the spreads, the four countries would have been able to avoid the latest
part of the slump but not the large buildup of public debt. Irish employment in particular would look very
much like Arizona in Figure (1) with a rebound in 2011-2012: in this counterfactual the eurozone and the
US are both monetary unions where central banks are successful in eliminating the risk of exit. Finally, we
analyze how diﬀerent the bust would have looked like if these countries had been able to regain in the bust
the competitiveness they had lost in the boom. One can think of this counterfactual as close to a situation
of flexible exchange rates where the exchange rate can depreciate quickly during a recession. We find that
they would have experienced a shorter and milder bust and a much smaller buildup in public debt.
Our paper is related to three lines of research: (i) macroeconomic models with credit frictions, (ii)
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monetary economics, (iii) sudden stops and sovereign defaults. We discuss the connections of our paper to
each topic. Following Bernanke and Gertler (1989), many macroeconomic papers introduce credit constraints
at the entrepreneur level (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), or Cooley et al. (2004)). In all
these models, the availability of credit limits corporate investment. As a result, credit constraints aﬀect the
economy by aﬀecting the size of the capital stock. Curdia and Woodford (2009) analyze the implication for
monetary policy of imperfect intermediation between borrowers and lenders. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
study a model where shocks that hit the financial intermediation sector lead to tighter borrowing constraints
for entrepreneurs. We model shocks in a similar way. The diﬀerence is that our borrowers are households,
not entrepreneurs, and, we argue, this makes a diﬀerence for the model’s cross-sectional implications. Models
that emphasize firm-level frictions cannot reproduce the strong correlation between household-leverage and
employment at the micro-level, unless the banking sector is island-specific, as in the small open economy
“Sudden Stop” literature (Chari et al. (2005), Mendoza (2010)). This “local lending channel” does not appear
to be operative across U.S. states, however, presumably because business lending is not very localized2. Our
framework is also related to heterogeneous-agent macroeconomic models such as Krusell and Smith (1998),
and models in the tradition of Campbell and Mankiw (1989), that feature impatient and patient consumers.
This type of models has been used by Gali et al. (2007) to analyze the impact of fiscal policy on consumption
and by Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) to analyze macroeconomic dynamics during the Great Recession.
Papers in the sudden stop literature have aimed at reproducing the stylized facts of these crises in emerging
markets. According to Korinek and Mendoza (2013) the key characteristics of a sudden stop are 1) a sharp,
sudden reversal in international capital flows, which is typically measured as a sudden increase in the current
account 2) a deep recessions and 3) sharp changes in relative prices, including exchange rate depreciations.
The eurozone crisis shares the two first characteristics even if the pace of current account adjustment in
the euro area is slower than for non euro area countries (such as Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania) and past
experiences of emerging markets crises (see Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) for a discussion). Substitution
of private-capital inflows by public inflows, especially Eurosystem financing, partly explains this diﬀerence.
The third characteristic of an emerging market sudden stop has been absent in the eurozone crisis: there
has been (so far) no currency depreciation and no sudden and large change in goods relative prices between
countries hit at diﬀerent degrees by a sudden stop (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Italy) and the rest
of the eurozone. That these countries belong to a monetary union means the eurozone sudden stop stands
2For instance, Mian and Sufi (2010) find that the predictive power of household borrowing remains the same in counties
dominated by national banks. It is also well known that businesses entered the recession with historically strong balanced sheets
and were able to draw on existing credit lines Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008).
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apart. These diﬀerences are important for the choice of modeling approach. The sudden stop literature
on emerging markets (see Mendoza (2010) and Korinek and Mendoza (2013) for example) has focused on
a Fisherian amplification mechanism where debts are denominated in diﬀerent units than incomes and
collateral. This is not the case in our model as we study countries that belong to a monetary union. Another
diﬀerence is that the sudden stop literature in emerging markets has focused on the sudden imposition of an
external credit constraint (see Mendoza and Smith (2006) and Christiano and Roldos (2004) for example) or
on transaction costs on international financial markets with multiple equilibria, as in Martin and Rey (2006).
Our model integrates, for the first time to our knowledge, both a domestic credit crunch and a sudden stop
produced by a spike in interest rate so that we can compare the impact of both on macroeconomic aggregates.
The role of interest rates in our model relates our work to the paper of Neumeyer and Perri (2005). In their
paper, as in ours, the economy is subject to interest rate shocks that generate a sudden stop in the form of
a current account reversal. However, the mechanism is very diﬀerent. In Neumeyer and Perri (2005), real
interest rates movements either exogenous or induced by productivity shocks amplify the eﬀect of the latter
on production because they induce a working capital shortage. In our model, the increase in interest rate
generates a demand shock through a fall in consumption.
Even if the bulk of the literature on sudden stops has put credit constraints at the center of the story,
Gopinath (2004) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) have focused on an alternative explanation with TFP
shocks taking center stage. Gopinath (2004) proposes a model with a search friction to generate asymmetric
responses to symmetric shocks. A search friction in foreign investors entry decision into emerging markets
creates an asymmetry in the adjustment process of the economy: An increase in traded sector productivity
raises GDP on impact and it continues to grow to a higher long-run level. On the other hand, a decline in
traded sector productivity causes GDP to contract in the short run by more than it does in the long-run.
A related approach is the possibility of growth shocks as explored in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). Because
of the income eﬀect, a negative shock leads to a fall in consumption and an increase in the trade balance.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) do not study the response of the labor market but it is well known that income
eﬀects tend move consumption and hours in opposite directions.
Shocks to trend TFP growth might be important in emerging markets, but they do not seem to explain
the dynamics of euro area countries over the past 5 years. With the exception of Greece, countries that were
hit by a sudden stop (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal) are not those for which the reversal in TFP
growth is the largest3 Moreover, as illustrated by figure 4, there is no correlation between the diﬀerential in
3If the diﬀerential of TFP is computed on the period 2010-2012, this conclusion remains unchanged.
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Figure 4: Changes in Trend TFP Do Not Explain the Eurozone Crisis
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Notes: Horizontal Axis is average TFP growth during 2008-2012 minus average TFP growth during 2000-2007 (source:
Conference Board). Vertical Axis is change in employment rate between 2008 and 2012.
TFP growth (between the periods 2008-2012 and 2000-2007) and employment growth during the bust (2008-
2012)4. Spain is a prime example. It is the only eurozone country that experienced an acceleration of its
TFP growth during the crisis. Sanguinetti and Fuentes (2012) show that “The Spanish economy experienced
significantly weaker labour productivity growth than other OECD economies and failed to catch up with the
most advanced economies in the period 1996-2007... The relatively weak performance largely reflects the low
growth of total factor productivity within a wide range of sectors, with very limited impact of composition
eﬀects, while the capital stock and educational attainment of the workforce have grown relatively strongly.”
We conclude that we need to look somewhere else for an explanation to the business cycles and to sudden
stops in the eurozone. We focus on leverage, interest rates and fiscal policy dynamics.
Most closely connected to our paper is the work of Midrigan and Philippon (2010), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni
(2010) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) who also study the responses of an economy to a household-level
credit crunch. Consistent with our results, Mian and Sufi (2012) show that diﬀerences in the debt overhang
of households across U.S. counties partly explain why unemployment is higher in some regions than others.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) emphasize the role of downward wage rigidity in the Eurozone recession.
Our paper is also related to the literature on sovereign default (see Eaton and Gersovitz (1982), Arellano
(2008) and Mendoza and Yue (2012)) that models default as a strategic decision with a tradeoﬀ between
gains from forgone repayment and the costs of exclusion from international credit markets. The objective
of our paper however is to analyze how the sovereign default risk can aﬀect the real economy through the
4A simple panel regression among Eurozone members on the period 2002-2012 of GDP growth on TFP growth, with or
without year fixed eﬀects and country fixed eﬀects reveals no significant correlation between GDP and TFP growth.
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impact it can have on liquidity available to households. The paper by Corsetti et al. (2013) considers a
“sovereign risk channel,” through which sovereign default risk spills over to the rest of the economy, raising
funding costs in the private sector. Finally the paper is related to the recent research on fiscal multipliers at
the regional level (Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), Farhi and Werning (2013)).
In Section 1 we present the model and in section 2 we analyze its dynamic properties. 3 presents the
calibration exercise and compares the reduced form model predictions to the data. In Section 4, we present
the structural relations between private leverage, fiscal policy and sudden stops. These serve to conduct the
final exercise on counterfactual policies presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1 Model
Our model can be interpreted as a large country with a collection of regions (e.g., USA), or a monetary union
with a collection of states (e.g., EZ). The key assumption are that these regions share a common currency,
and that agents live and work in only one region.
We study a small open economy that trades with other regions of the currency area as in Gali and Monacelli
(2008). Each region j produces a tradable domestic good and is populated by households who con-
sume the domestic good and an aggregate of foreign goods. Following Mankiw (2000) and more recently
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), we assume that households are heterogenous in their degree of time prefer-
ences. More precisely, in region j, there is a fraction χj of impatient households, and 1−χj of patient ones.
Patient households (indexed by i = s for savers) have a higher discount factor than borrowers (indexed by
i = b for borrowers): β ≡ βs > βb. Saving and borrowing are in units of the currency of the monetary union.
1.1 Within period trade and production.
Consider household i in region j at time t. Within period, all households have the same log preferences over
the consumption of home (h), foreign goods (f), and labor supply:
ui,j,t = αj log
(
Chi,j,t
αj
)
+ (1− αj) log
(
Cfi,j,t
1− αj
)
− ν (Ni,j,t)
With these preferences, households of region j spend a fraction αj of their income on home goods, and
1 − αj on foreign goods. The parameter αj measures how closed the economy is, because of home bias in
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preferences or trade costs. The demand functions are then:
phj,tC
h
i,j,t = αjXi,j,t,
pft C
f
i,j,t = (1− αj)Xi,j,t.
where
Xi,j,t ≡ phj,tChi,j,t + pft Cfi,j,t
measures the spending of household i in region j in period t, phj,t is the price of home goods in country j and
pft is the price index of foreign goods. This gives the indirect utility
U (Xi,j,t, Pj,t) = log (Xi,j,t)− logPj,t − ν (Ni,j,t) ,
where the CPI of country j is logPj,t = αj log phj,t + (1− αj) log pfj,t, the PPI is phj,t, and the terms of trade
are p
f
t
phj,t
. From the perspective of country j, foreign demand for home good Fj,t is exogenous, and we assume
a unit elasticity with respect to export price phj,t. Production is linear in labor Nj,t, and competitive, so
phj,t = wj,t. Market clearing in the goods market requires
Nj,t = χjC
h
b,j,t + (1− χj)Chs,j,t +
Fj,t
phj,t
+
Gj,t
phj,t
,
where Gj,t are nominal government expenditures. Note that we assume that the government spends only on
domestic goods. Define nominal domestic product as
Yj,t ≡ phj,tNj,t
and total private expenditures as
X¯j,t ≡ χjXb,j,t + (1− χj)Xs,j,t.
It is useful to write the market clearing condition in nominal terms (in euros)
Yjt = αjX¯j,t + Fj,t +Gj,t. (1)
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Each household supplies labor at the prevailing wage and receives wage income net of taxes (1− τj,t)wj,tNj,t.
They also receive transfers from the government Zj,t. We assume that wages are sticky and we ration the
labor market uniformly across households. This assumption simplifies the analysis because we do not need
to keep track separately of the labor income of patient and impatient households within a country. Not much
changes if we relax this assumption, except that we loose some tractability.5
1.2 Inter-temporal budget constraints
Let Bj,t be the face value of the debt issued in period t− 1 by impatient households and due in period t. It
will be convenient to define disposable income (after tax and transfers but before interest payments) as
Y˜j,t ≡ (1− τj,t) Yj,t + Zj,t.
The budget constraint of impatient households in countryj is then
Bj,t+1
1 + rj,t
+ Y˜j,t = Xb,j,t +Bj,t, (2)
where rj,t is the nominal borrowing rate between t and t+1. We assume that interest rates are time varying
and may be country-specific. Borrowing is subject to the exogenous limit Bhj,t:
Bj,t ≤ Bhj,t. (3)
The savers budget constraint is:
Sj,t + Y˜j,t = Xs,j,t +
Sj,t+1
1 + rj,t
, (4)
so their Euler equation is
1
Xs,j,t
= Et
[
β (1 + rj,t)
Xs,j,t+1
]
. (5)
5In response to a negative shock, impatient households would try to work more. The prediction that hours increase more
for credit constrained households appears to be counter-factual however. One can fix this by assuming a low elasticity of labor
supply, which essentially boils down to assuming that hours worked are rationed uniformly in response to slack in the labor
market. Assuming that the elasticity of labor supply is small (near zero) also means that the natural rate does not depend on
fiscal policy. In an extension we study the case where the natural rate is defined by the labor supply condition in the pseudo-
steady state ν′
(
n⋆i
)
= (1− τj)
wj
xi,j
. We can then ration the labor market relative to their natural rate: ni,j,t =
n⋆i (τ)∑
i n
⋆
i (τ)
nj,t
where n⋆i (τ) is the natural rate for household i in country. This ensures consistency and convergence to the correct long run
equilibrium. Steady state changes in the natural rate are quantitatively small, however, so the dynamics that we study are
virtually unchanged. See Midrigan and Philippon (2010) for a discussion.
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Note that financial markets clear in two ways in our model. For the impatient agents, given that they are
quantity constrained, interest rates do not aﬀect their borrowing. For the patient agents, their saving is
determined by the interest rates through the Euler equation.
The government budget constraint is:
Bgj,t+1
1 + rj,t
+ τj,tYjt = Gj,t + Zj,t +B
g
j,t, (6)
where Bgj,t is public debt issued by government j at time t− 1.
1.3 Exports and foreign assets
Nominal exports are Fj,t and nominal imports are (1− αj)Xj,t since the government does not buy imported
goods while private agents spend a fraction 1− αj on foreign goods. So net exports are:
Ej,t = Fj,t − (1− αj)Xj,t. (7)
The net foreign asset position of the country at the end of period t, measured in market value, is:
Aj,t ≡ (1− χj) Sj,t+1
1 + rj,t
− χj
Bhj,t+1
1 + rj,t
− B
g
j,t+1
1 + rj,t
. (8)
Adding up the budget constraints, we have the spending equation
Xj,t + p
h
j,tGj,t = Yj,t + χj
(
Bhj,t+1
1 + rj,t
−Bhj,t
)
− (1− χj)
(
Sj,t+1
1 + rj,t
− Sj,t
)
+
Bgj,t+1
1 + rj,t
−Bgj,t (9)
Total spending (public and private) equals total income (nominal GDP) plus total net borrowing. If we
combine with the market clearing condition (1), we get the current account condition
CAj,t ≡ Aj,t −Aj,t−1 = Ej,t + rj,t−1Aj,t−1,
It will often be convenient to rewrite (9) with disposable income as
(1− αj) Y˜j,t = αjχj
(
Bhj,t+1
1 + rj,t
−Bhj,t
)
− αj (1− χj)
(
Sj,t+1
1 + rj,t
− Sj,t
)
+ Fj,t +
Bgj,t+1
1 + rj,t
−Bgj,t. (10)
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1.4 Employment and Inflation
The system above completely pins down the dynamics of nominal variables: Yj,t, Xi,j,t, etc. Employment
(real output) is given by
Nj,t =
Yj,t
phj,t
.
We need to specify the dynamics of inflation. Letting N⋆ denote the natural rate of unemployment, we
assume the following Phillips curve:
phj,t − phj,t−1
phj,t−1
= κ (Nj,t −N⋆) (11)
2 Dynamic Properties of the Model
We now study the nominal dynamics of the small open economy. The main challenge is to pin down the
behavior of savers. Our first task is to understand why and how savers do, or do not, react to certain shocks.
2.1 Savers’ Inter-temporal Budget
The complete objective function of the savers is
∑
t≥0 β
t (log (Xs,j,t)− log (Pj,t)− ν (Nj,t)) . Prices are addi-
tively separable thanks to log preferences. In addition, our rationing rule for labor implies that Nj,t depends
only on aggregate variables. The problem of the savers can therefore be written as:
max
∑
t≥0 β
t log (Xs,j,t)
Xs,j,t +
Sj,t+1
1+rj,t
= Sj,t + Y˜j,t
where Y˜j,t and rj,t are both random variables.6 Let us focus first on the budget constraint, and its Ri-
cardian properties. Let us first define the k-period discount rate from the savers’ perspective as Rj,t,k ≡
(1 + rj,t) .. (1 + rj,t+k−1), with the convention Rj,t,0 = 1. We can then write the inter-temporal budget
constraint of savers as
Et
∞∑
k=0
Xs,j,t+k
Rj,t,k
= Sj,t + Et
∞∑
k=0
Y˜j,t+k
Rj,t,k
. (12)
6This is a well-studied problem but we will not do justice to all of its interesting aspects. In particular, we will neglect
(for now) the role of precautionary savings and use a certainty equivalent approach by linearizing the Euler equation. Because
of precautionary savings, we know that the interest rate consistent with finite savings must be such that β (1 + r) < 1. We
consider the limit where aggregate shocks are small and β (1 + r) is close to one.
13
The quantity on the left is the net present value of spending. The quantity on the right is the current savings
plus the net present value of disposable income. Because we can relate the net present value of disposable
income to the inter-temporal current account for the country, we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. The inter-temporal current account condition for country j is
(1− αj)
(
(1− χj)Sj,t − χjBhj,t + Et
∞∑
k=0
Y˜j,t+k
Rj,t,k
)
= (1− χj)Sj,t − χjBhj,t −Bgj,t + Et
∞∑
k=0
Fj,t+k
Rj,t,k
.
Proof. See Appendix.
On the left we have private wealth (discounted at the savers’s rate) and 1 − αj is the share of wealth
spent on imports. On the right we have net foreign assets plus the value of exports. The key point here is
that the inter-temporal current-account condition pins down the NPV of disposable income, as a function of
current assets, home bias and foreign demand.
If we combine the Lemma with the inter-temporal budget constraint (12), we obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1. Nominal spending by savers (Xs,j,t) does not react to private credit shocks (Bhj,t+1) or to
fiscal policy (neither Gj,t nor Zj,t). It only reacts to interest rate and foreign demand shocks.
Proof. Lemma 1 shows that the net present value of disposable income is a function of four variables:
Et
∞∑
k=0
Y˜j,t+k
Rj,t,k
≡ Vj,t = !
(
Sj,t, B
h
j,t, B
g
j,t,Et
∞∑
k=0
Fj,t+k
Rj,t,k
)
where the first three variables (saving, household debt, public debt) are pre-determined at time t and the
last one (exports) is exogenous. Therefore, equation (12) is in fact
Et
∞∑
k=0
Xs,j,t+k
Rj,t,k
= Sj,t + Vj,t
So current spending of savers can only depend on Vj,t and the path of interest rates. In particular, for
given Vj,t and interest rates, it cannot depend on contemporaneous or future private credit and fiscal policy.
QED.
Proposition 1 clarifies the behavior of savers. Their spending reacts neither to Gj,t nor to Zj,t. This
result is related to – but also diﬀerent from – Ricardian equivalence. To understand it, one needs to focus
14
on the budget constraint of the patient households. Clearly, shocks to interest rates will aﬀect this budget
constraint and also the Euler equation, so we know that they will aﬀect spending Xs,j,t. What is surprising
is that, even though changes in the borrowing constraints of impatient agents or changes in fiscal policy
have a direct impact on disposable income Y˜j,t, savers do not react. The reason is that patient agents know
that higher spending today – which increases output – means higher interest payments in the future – which
decreases spending and output. The key result is that the net present value of disposable income does not
change. Changes in Bhj,t, Gj,t, Zj,t, τ have no eﬀect on the permanent income of patient agents. Shocks to
foreign demand, on the other hand, aﬀect consumption expenditures of patient households because they aﬀect
their permanent income. Of course, even when expenditures remain constant, this does not mean that real
consumption remains constant. In fact real consumption always changes because prices (wages) always react
to changes in aggregate spending. These results depend on our using the preferences of Cole and Obstfeld
(1991). Farhi and Werning (2013) discuss the implications of these preferences for government multipliers
in currency unions.
2.2 Scaling and Spreads
Proposition 1 explains why savers do not react to demand shocks. But savers react to interest rates and
to foreign demand shocks. We consider an economy subject to four series of shocks: the borrowing limit
of the impatient households Bhj,t, foreign demand Fj,t, interest rates, and fiscal policy. We assume that the
variance of these shocks is small and linearize the Euler equation (5) as Et [Xs,j,t+1] ≈ β (1 + rj,t)Xs,j,t.
The equivalent equation for the monetary union as a whole is Et
[
X∗s,t+1
] ≈ β (1 + r∗t )X∗s,t, where r∗t is the
interest for the monetary union as a whole. We define the spread shock as:
1 + ρj,t ≡ 1 + rj,t
1 + r∗t
We show in the Appendix that if we scale all our variables by X∗s,t :
xs,j,t ≡ Xs,j,t
X∗s,t
(13)
Then we have
Et [xs,j,t+1] ≈ (1 + ρj,t)xs,j,t (14)
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From now on we work with scaled variables (in lower case). For example, the patient budget constraint
becomes:
xs,j,t +
β
1 + ρj,t
sj,t+1 = sj,t + y˜j,t.
Finally, we maintain assumption A1 throughout the paper
Assumptions A1.
• Et [fj,t+1] = fj,t,
• Et [ρj,t+1] = 0;
Assumptions A1 say that the shocks on foreign demand are permanent and spreads are iid. These two
conditions are assumed to hold throughout the paper.
2.3 Impulse responses to shocks
We now present simple impulse response functions to build intuition about the mechanisms of the model.
These intuitions will be useful when we perform our simulations. The details of the assumptions and policy
functions used to compute these impulse responses are in the Appendix.
We present in Figures (5), (6), (7) and (8) the simple impulse reaction functions7 that illustrate the
impact of shocks on household debt (bhj,t), public spending (gj,t), interest rates (rj,t) and foreign demand
(fj,t). An increase in household debt generates a boom in nominal GDP, employment, spending of impatient
households (but not of patient ones who increase their saving, as explained in Proposition 1) and imports.
Public debt falls but the net foreign asset position deteriorates. A fiscal expansion through an increase in
public expenditures has qualitatively similar eﬀects except that in this case public debt increases, although
it decreases temporarily in percentage of GDP. The GDP multipliers for household debt and government
spending both increase with αi and χi. The reason is that a higher share of spending on domestic goods
reduces leakage through imports. A higher share of impatient agents in the economy implies that an in-
crease in household debt or disposable income (through higher government spending) has a larger impact on
7For these impulse response functions, we use the following parameters: α = 0.75,χ = 0.5, r = 0.05, κ = 0.2, τ = 0.4. Prices,
wages and employment are normalized to unity at time t = 0. The debt to income ratio is set at 60% for impatient households
at time t = 0, so that the household debt to income ratio is 30%. The government debt to GDP ratio is set at 50% and the net
foreign asset position over GDP is set at zero at time t = 0. The shock is a 20% increase of the variable at t = 1.
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aggregate expenditures. Remember that patient agents expenditures do not react to private or public debt
changes.
An increase in interest rates is very diﬀerent because it induces patient households to save more so it
reduces their expenditures and generates a recession (fall in nominal GDP and in employment) that obliges
impatient households to reduce their spending. Imports fall and the net foreign asset position improves.
Because of lower tax revenues, the recession increases public debt. Finally, an increase in foreign demand
permanently increases nominal GDP which induces patient households to increase their saving. Spending of
both patient and impatient households increase. The net foreign asset position improves. Public debt falls
because of higher tax revenues.
Figure 5: Private Credit Expansion
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Figure 6: Fiscal Expansion
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Figure 7: Interest rate shock
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Figure 8: Foreign demand shock
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3 Calibration and Reduced Form Model
We next analyze a cross-sectional experiment to compare the model predictions and the data. We describe
the sources of the cross-sectional and aggregate data we use in the Appendix. We use data for 11 Eurozone
countries from 2000 to 2012: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands and Portugal and calibrate the shocks on the observed data.
3.1 Calibration
In order to map the observed data into the model we rebase the data with aggregate Eurozone spending, as in
Equation (13). We compute a benchmark in the same manner for private and public spending, transfers and
unit labor costs. The normalized data is the ratio of the observed data to this benchmark level. This enables
us therefore to interpret these as deviations from the benchmark levels for each data series we observe. For
both the household debt and the government debt, the rebased levels are the ratios of debt to the benchmark
levels of GDP. Aggregate variables (employment, nominal GDP, private and public spending, transfers, taxes,
exports...) are analyzed either in per capita terms or in ratios of GDP. For employment per capita, we take
the deviation with respect to 2002 with an index of 1 for that year. 2002 is also the base year for private
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and public spending and unit labor costs. The normalized data for household and public debt are shown
in figure (33) in the Appendix. Normalized public spending and transfers are shown (34). Note also that
government spending is adjusted for expenditures on bank recapitalization.
The parameters that serve in the simulations are given in Table (1).
Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Name Value
Annual Discount Factor β 0.98
Domestic share of consumption αj country specific
Share of credit constrained households χj country specific
Phillips curve parameter κ 0.2
For the country specific domestic share of consumption, αj , we rely on Bussiere et al. (2011) who compute
the total import content of expenditure components, including the value of indirect imports. For consumption
expenditures and for our sample our countries the average implied domestic share in 2005 (the latest date
in their study) is 72.7%. The lowest is 66.4% for Belgium and the highest is 78.7% for Italy. For the
country specific share of credit constrained borrowers, χj , we use the Eurosystem Household Finance and
Consumption Survey (HFCS)8. This survey has been used recently by Kaplan et al. (2014) to quantify the
share of hand-to-month households. The later paper defines these as consumers who spend all of their
available resources in every pay-period, and hence do not carry any wealth across periods. They argue that
measuring this behavior using data on net worth (as consistent with heterogeneous-agent macroeconomic
models ) is misleading because this misses what they call the wealthy hand-to-mouth households. These are
households who hold sizable amounts of wealth in illiquid assets (such as housing or retirement accounts),
but very little or no liquid wealth, and therefore consume all of their disposable income every period. They
define hand-to-mouth consumers as those households in the survey whose average balances of liquid wealth
are positive but equal to or less than half their earnings. We use a related measure by Mendicino (2014), who
for each country computes the fraction of household with liquid assets below two months of total households
gross income to approximate the share of credit constrained households. The average for our set of countries
is 48% with a maximum of 64.8% for Greece and a minimum of 34.7% for Austria. Ireland did not participate
in the survey so for this country we use the average of the eurozone. These two parameters, the share of
credit constrained households (χj) and the domestic share of consumption (αj), for our panel of countries
are shown on figure (9).
8The survey took place in 2010. In Greece and Spain, the data were collected in 2009 and 2008-09 respectively.
20
Figure 9: Share of credit constrained households (χj) and domestic share of consumption (αj)
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To transform observed aggregate household debt in the data into household debt bj,t in the model which
is debt per impatient household (with share ψj), we take the household to benchmark income ratio for each
country and then divide it by the share of impatient in the country χj . We use t0 = 2002 as our base year.
Given the absence of an intermediate goods sector in our model, we cannot use the value of gross exports
as a measure of foreign demand, Fj,t. The trade linked to international production networks has been well
documented (see for example Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013)). In the context of our model, we need to
measure the domestic value added that is associated with final consumption in the rest of the world, which
corresponds to value added based exports. As detailed in the data appendix, we use the data from the
OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) initiative to measure domestic value added embodied in gross
exports. The normalized value-added based exports are shown in figure (35) in appendix. Finally, we take
into account net EU transfers which are the diﬀerence between EU spending in the country and the country
contribution to the EU. In our model, they play exactly the same role as foreign demand so we add EU net
transfers to exports in the goods market equation.
Finally, we must take a stand on how to measure interest rate spreads across countries. From the
perspective of our model, we need to measure the funding cost of agents who are on their Euler equation
(equivalently, if we think of firms, their Tobin’s q equation). We start from the yields on long term government
debt (annual averages of 10 year government bond rates) and we compute for each country the deviation
from the median of the Eurozone. These spreads can be large, and it is clear that they partly reflect credit
risk. In the case of Greece, the spread was over 20%, but this was not the expected return. The issue
is then: should we remove expected credit losses? If yes, how? The answer is complex. If there are no
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deadweight losses from government default, we should remove expected credit losses, since these would be
transfers across agents, and would not represent real funding costs. But in reality there are costs of default.
There is also the important issue of debt overhang in the banking sector. When its debt becomes risky, the
bank has an incentive to take risks. Investing in its own sovereign debt becomes attractive because it is
correlated with its own risk. When debt overhang is large and the correlation is high, the bank may end up
treating the entire yield as an expected return because it only cares about the non-default state (since in the
other states it is bust in any case). Even if the spread reflects credit risk, it would still represent a funding
cost for bank-dependent borrowers. The bottom line is that there is no simple way to adjust the spreads.
We use the following approach. We gather data on deposit rates and we compare it to government yields.
We then apply a function to reduce the yields so that their fluctuations become comparable to the ones of
deposit rates.9 We apply the following filter:
ρ = ∆I∆<1% +
∆− 1%
2
I∆∈[1%,3%] +
∆− 3%
4
I∆∈[3%,5%] +
∆− 5%
8
I∆>5%,
where ∆ is the deviation of the yield from the Eurozone median and ρ is our measure of spreads in funding
costs. What this means is that, for the first 100 basis points, we treat the spread as a funding cost. This
is consistent with estimates of flight to quality towards German assets and liquidity risk. Then we divide
the spread by two, etc. Above 500 basis points, we assume that only 1/8th of the spread represent funding
costs. This filter creates funding costs that are comparable to the (limited) data we have on deposit rates.
Since the filter is rather ad-hoc, we have performed a large number of robustness checks. The results are
robust as long as we trim the large spreads (otherwise the drop in consumption by savers is simply too large
to be consistent with the data). Both the 10 year government bond spreads (the deviation of the yield from
the Eurozone median) and ρ as measured in the equation above are shown in figure (36) in appendix.
3.2 Reduced Form Simulations
We first consider the predictions of the model taking as given the observed series for private debt (bhj,t), fiscal
policy (gj,t, zj,t, τj) and interest rate spreads (ρj,t). In other words, the reduced form model ℜ is a mapping
ℜ : (bhj,t, gj,t, zj,t, ρj,t) −→ (bgj,t, yj,t, nj,t, pj,t, ej,t, ..) (15)
9We cannot use deposit rates directly because there are many missing values and they react too slowly to news.
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To run the simulations, we first need to set the initial conditions in a particular year. We use 2002 as our
base year.
1. Natural employment and prices are normalized to n⋆ = 1 and phj,t0 = 1 (so nominal GDP is normalized
in the base year to: yj,t0 = 1)
2. Variables set to their observed values are: bhj,t0 , zj,t0 , gj,t0 , b
g
j,t0
, bgj,t0−1, rj,t0 . We then get fj,t0 , τj and
y˜j,t0 from market clearing and budget constraints:
(a) Foreign demand fj,t0 is chosen to match net exports ej,t0 =
1
αj
(fj,t0 − (1− αj) (yj,t0 − gj,t0))
(b) Get τj from the government budget constraint gj,t0 + zj,t0 − τjyj,t0 =
bgj,t0+1
1+rj,t0
− bgj,t0
(c) Disposable income at time t0 is y˜j,t0 = (1− τj) yj,t0 + zj,t0
3. Savers’ assets sj,t0 and sj,t0−1 are chosen to solve the equilibrium conditions
(a) sj,t = (1 + ρj,t) (sj,t−1 + y˜j,t)− Et [y˜j,t+1]
(b) (1− αj)Et [y˜j,t+1] = r1+r
(
αj (1− χj) sj,t+1 − αjχjbhj,t+1 − bgj,t+1
)
+ fj,t.
(c) (1− αj) y˜j,t = αjχj
(
bhj,t+1
1+rj,t
− bhj,t
)
+ αj (1− χj)
(
sj,t − sj,t+11+rj,t
)
+
b
g
j,t+1
1+rj,t
− bgj,t + fj,t.
We then feed exogenous processes for the diﬀerent shocks (using scales values) for observed household debt
(bhj,t), fiscal policy (τj , zj,t,gj,t), and interest rate spreads ρj,t. For the sake of completeness, we also feed
exogenous foreign nominal demand shocks fj,t, even though they are not crucial for our analysis. For
each country, we simulate the path between 2001 and 2012 of nominal GDP yj,t, nominal spending xj,t,
employment nj,t, net exports ej,t and public debt b
g
j,t.
The normalized data on observed shocks that serve to feed the model for each country are shown in
figures (33), (34), (36) and (35) in appendix.
Just to be clear, there is no degree of freedom in our simulations of nominal variables. There is no
parameter which is set to match any moment in the data. The model is entirely constrained by observable
micro estimates and by equilibrium conditions. The only parameter that we can adjust is the slope of the
Phillips curve κ but it does not aﬀect the nominal GDP in euros, it only pins down the allocation of nominal
GDP between prices (unit labor cost) and quantities (employment).
Figures (10), (11), (12) show the simulated and observed nominal GDP, net exports and employment.
The reduced form model reproduces very well the cross sectional dynamics in the euro zone for nominal
GDP and net exports. In particular, it replicates well the boom and bust dynamics on nominal GDP and
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the current account reversal for the crisis hit countries. For employment, the model does also well for the
crisis countries and for countries that were hit less severely.
Figure 10: Simulated and observed nominal GDP
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Figure 11: Simulated and observed net exports
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Figure 12: Simulated and observed employment
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4 Structural Model
In order to run counterfactuals we need to take into account that private leverage, spreads and fiscal policy
may be interrelated. Hence, we need to identify the structural relations between the three variables. We
think of country dynamics as being driven by three structural shocks. The first one is a boom/bust cycle in
private debt, which we call credit bubble for short. The second one is a political economy bias in government
spending that creates fiscal imbalances. The third is a (potentially self-fulfilling) sudden stop that threatens
the stability of the eurozone. Formally, we think of the structural model ℑ as a mapping
ℑ : (Credit Bubble, Political Economy, Sudden Stop) −→ (bhj,t, gj,t, zj,t, ρj,t; bgj,t, yj,t, nj,t, pj,t, ej,t, ..) (16)
The key point of the structural model is to explain the variables that we took as exogenous in the reduced
form model (15). The challenge is to identify these shocks in the data.
We now present our identification strategy. This strategy is based on a mix of theoretical modeling and
empirical identification using instrumental variables. When we talk about the “structural” model, we do not
mean that we have provided micro-foundations for every detail of the model. Given the range of data and
economic forces that we need to capture, this is not even remotely possible. But we mean that, either there
is an explicit theoretical equation, or there is an identified empirical equation that allows us to capture the
influence of one variable on the others.
4.1 Using the US to identify private leverage dynamics
We use the US as a control group to estimate leverage dynamics without sudden stops. More precisely, we
estimate the following model for deleveraging in a panel of U.S. states
bh,USj,t =
3∑
k=1
αUSk b
h,US
j,t−k + ϵj,t
for t = 2008, .., 2012, j = 1, ..52, and bhj,t is household debt detrended exactly as in the Eurozone. The idea
is that these private leverage bubbles reflected various global and financial factors: low real rates, financial
innovations, regulatory arbitrage of the Basel rules by banks, real estate bubbles, etc. To a large extent
these forces were present both in Europe and in the US. The diﬀerence of course is that there was no sudden
stops within the US. Hence, we interpret the US experience as representative of a deleveraging outcome in
a monetary union without sudden stops.
26
Another issue is whether fiscal policy was not also active in the US. Perhaps private debt bubbles were
associated with large fiscal revenues and large spending. This probably happened to some extent, but
compared to the Eurozone, these eﬀects are small (of course we are only talking about cross-sectional
variation in government spending). Figure 13 shows this for two states and two countries. A regression for
all the states and all the countries shows that the link between private debt and government spending was
at least four times smaller in the US than in Europe.
Figure 13: Government Spending
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We therefore argue that the US provides a benchmark for private deleveraging without sudden stops,
and with relatively neutral (cross-sectional) fiscal policy. We then take the estimated coeﬃcients αUSk and
use them to construct predicted deleveraging in Eurozone countries:
bˆhj,t =
K∑
k=1
αUSk b
h,
j,t−k
for t = 2008, .., 2012 and j = 1..11. Figure 14 illustrates the results for California and Ireland. The model
predicts a somewhat slower deleveraging in Ireland than actually happened. This is also the case for other
countries that experienced a sudden stop.
We now posit the following structural equations. Private leverage in euro zone countries is given by:
bhj,t+1 = λ
h
0 + bˆ
h
j,t + λ
ρ,hρj,t. (17)
Private leverage is equal to the prediction from the US experience plus the impact of the spread. The first
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Figure 14: Private Deleveraging
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element of the private leverage, bˆhj,t, is interpreted as an exogenous shock. The second element, the impact
of the spread, is endogenous and is meant to capture various transmission channels. An obvious one is
the funding costs of banks: an increase in ρj,t would decrease bank lending. Another channel is that debt
demand by impatient agents is not entirely interest inelastic as we have assumed in our simplified model. It
will turn out, however, that λρh is not large and that these channels do not appear to be very important.
4.2 Bond pricing
The second equation of the structural model captures bond pricing:
ρj,t = σt ×
[
λρ0 + λ
g,ρbgj,t + λ
g,high,ρbg,highj,t + λ
h,ρbhj,t + λ
rec,ρrecapj,t
]
(18)
where σt captures the size of the sudden stop. This equation says that funding costs start to diverge when
there is a sudden stop in the eurozone and that the extent to which this happens in diﬀerent countries
depends on public debt bgj,t, private debt b
h
j,t but also recapitalization of the financial sector (recapj,t). This
specification captures financial frictions associated with high leverage (debt overhang, risk shifting, adverse
selection, runs, etc.). We allow the impact of public debt on spreads to be non linear to take into account the
case of Greece. More specifically, we allow the coeﬃcient to be higher for levels of debt above 100% of GDP
so we define bg,highj,t ≡
(
bgj,t − 1
) (
bgj,t > 1
)
. In our data, this non linear eﬀect is only significant for Greece.
Finally, we have assumed so far that spreads are iid (even though the risk free rate can be persistent). Hence,
we assume that Et [σt+1] = 0. This means that agents in our economy anticipate that sudden stops, if any,
last for a year.
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We estimate the coeﬃcients λ’s on the period 2008-2012 for the 11 eurozone countries. We do so by
running instrumental variable regressions. For ρj,t in equation (17) we use government debt lagged two
and three years as instruments. For government and private debt bgj,t and b
h
j,t, in equation (18), we use
as instruments government debt levels (bgj,t and b
g,high
j,t ) lagged three years, the exogenous component of
private debt (and its lag) predicted by the US experience bˆhj,t. To capture the possibility and the size of a
sudden stop in the eurozone, we measure the coeﬃcient σt as the divergence in spreads across the eurozone
countries. More precisely, for each year, σt equals the mean of the absolute value of spreads in the eurozone.
As expected, it is low and close to zero up to 2007 and starts increasing in 2008 with a maximum in 2012.
The estimated coeﬃcients, which we will use in our simulations, are shown in Table (2):
Table 2: Coeﬃcients Estimated with Instrumental Variables.
λh0 λ
ρ,h λρ0 λ
g,ρ λh,ρ λrec,ρ
−0.005 −1.2 −2.3 2 1.2 15
(0.002) (0.184) (0.16) (0.4) (0.3) (3)
Note: standard errors in parenthesis.
For the non linear eﬀect of public debt on spreads, we set λg,high,ρ = 1 since it gives the best fit for
Greece.
4.3 Policy Function
The last task is to specify the fiscal policy function of the diﬀerent governments. Fiscal policy is implemented
via government spending gj,t and transfers zj,t, while linear taxes are left constant. We assume that the
government has two main macroeconomic objectives but is constrained by its costs of funds. His two
objectives are to target a level of expenditure g˜j,t and transfers z˜j,t (that may be drifting over time), and
to stabilize employment around a natural rate n¯j . We choose n¯j for all countries to be the normalized
employment level in 2002 so we set n¯j = 1. The funding constraint is measured by the (lagged) spread ρj,t−1
and is only binding when the spread is positive.10 Hence, the policy rule for government spending, with
parameters γn and γρ, is given by:
gj,t = g˜j,t + γ
n (nj,t − n¯) + γρρj,t−1 if ρj,t−1 > 0, (19)
gj,t = g˜j,t + γ
n (nj,t − n¯) if ρj,t−1 < 0,
10We use the t-1 spread simply because it fits better, which probably reflects implementation lags in fiscal policy. This is not
related to the identification of the model.
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where g˜j,t is a country specific drift which is linearly increasing until 2008 and flat afterwards:
g˜j,t = gj,0 + δ
g
j (t− t0) (t < 2008) + δgj (2008− t0) (t > 2008) (20)
with t0 = 2002. Hence, δ
g
j represents the average annual spending growth rate during the boom years. We
interpret this drift as a political bias in spending decisions. We want to analyze to what extent this spending
drift during the boom years may have contributed to the euro crisis. The same structural equations apply
to transfers zj,t with specific values for zj,0 and δzj .
We now focus on the four countries that were most harshly hit by the crisis, namely Spain, Greece,
Ireland and Portugal. We choose our parameters in the policy rule γn andγρ and the spending and transfer
drift coeﬃcients δgj and δ
z
j such that the model reproduces as best as possible the dynamics of observed
nominal GDP, public debt, employment and spreads.
This leads us to choose the parameters given in Table (3) and (4) :
Table 3: Fiscal policy coeﬃcients
γn γρ
−0.9 −7
Table 4: Fiscal policy drifts: government spending and transfers
δgj δ
z
j
Spain Greece Ireland Portugal Spain Greece Ireland Portugal
1% 3% 1.5% 0% 1.5% 3.5% 2% 0.5%
Note that the spending and transfers drift necessary to reproduce the debt dynamics is (not surprisingly)
much larger in Greece than in the other periphery countries. It is intermediate and similar in Ireland and
Spain and almost non existent in Portugal.
We also need to take into account the specific case of Greece which benefited in 2012 from a debt relief
that reduced its public debt by around 50% of GDP and in 2011, from a reduction in interest rates and an
extension in the repayment period for the EU and IMF rescue package. We do this by adding 10% of GDP
and 40% of GDP to government revenues in 2011 and 2012. This allows to better replicate the Greek debt
in 2012.
30
4.4 Fit of the structural model
The structural model is a constrained version of the reduced form model presented earlier. We can now
formally write equation (16) as
ℑ :
(
bˆhj,t; g˜j,t, z˜j,t;σt
)
−→ (bhj,t, gj,t, zj,t, ρj,t; bgj,t, yj,t, nj,t, pj,t, ej,t, ..) (21)
subject to the equilibrium condition of the model and the structural equations (17), (18) and (19). There
are three sets of exogenous shocks: the fiscal drifts (δgj and δ
z
j ) on government expenditures g˜j,t and transfers
z˜j,t, the private leverage that would have been predicted by the US experience bˆhj,t, the sudden stop shock
σt.
We show in figures (15), (16), (17), (18) and (19), how our structural model with these benchmark
parameters performs in reproducing the main macro dynamics (nominal GDP, employment, net exports,
public debt and spreads) of the four periphery countries. Overall, the structural model does very well in
reproducing the boom and bust episodes. The model and observed data depart in a few dimensions: 1) the
Irish nominal GDP (but not employment) bust comes too late in the model; 2) the employment boom is
under-predicted in Spain and over-predicted in Greece; 3) Spreads are under-predicted in Portugal.
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Figure 15: Nominal GDP, Structural Model
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Figure 16: Employment, Structural Model
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Figure 17: Net Exports, Structural Model
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Figure 18: Government Debt, Structural Model
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Figure 19: Interest Rate Spreads, Structural Model
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5 Counterfactual experiments
We now present our main structural experiments. The goal is to provide counter-factual simulations of what
would have happened to the four countries (Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal) that were most aﬀected
by the crisis had they followed a diﬀerent set of policies. We consider four counterfactuals:
• fiscal policy: what would have happened if those countries had pursued a more conservative fiscal
policy before 2008?
• macro-prudential policies: what would have happened if they had limited the growth of household
debt?
• monetary policy: what would have happened if the “whatever it takes” commitment by the ECB had
been announced in 2008 rather than in 2012?
• competitiveness: what would have happened if they had been able to recoup during the bust the
competitiveness they had lost in the boom?
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For the counterfactual experiments, we use the structural equations (17) and (18) for private debt and spreads
respectively and the fiscal policy rule (19). We use the same coeﬃcient estimates from the instrumental
variables regression (shown in Table 2) for the structural equations for private debt and spreads and the
policy rule (19). For all counterfactual experiments, we compare on the same graph the data and the
counterfactual experiment which we define as: structural model with counterfactual parameters + (data -
structural model with benchmark parameters) so that we take into account that the structural model with
benchmark parameters does not perfectly reproduce the data although we have seen that it does so very
well. The simulation generates cross sectional time series for public debt, private debt, employment, nominal
GDP, net exports and spreads on the period 2001-2012, using debt in 2000 as an initial point.
5.1 Counterfactual with a more conservative fiscal policy in the boom
How would countries have fared if they had followed more conservative fiscal policies during the boom? We
answer this question by removing the fiscal drift bias in the fiscal rule (19). Hence, we set δgj and δ
z
j equal to
zero for the four periphery countries. For Spain, Ireland and Portugal all the other benchmark parameters
are left unchanged. For Greece, we need to deal with the debt relief issue. Given that the counterfactual
conservative fiscal policy generates debt to GDP ratios below 110%, we assume that debt relief would not
have taken place. Hence, for Greece the counterfactual is the combination of a more conservative fiscal policy
but also the elimination of a transfer of around 50% of nominal GDP.
The elimination of the fiscal drift dramatically changes the public debt accumulation for Greece, Ireland
and Spain but very little in Portugal which is not surprising given that our exercise suggests that the fiscal
drift was very large in Greece, large in Ireland and Spain but small in Portugal. This can be seen in figure
(20) where counterfactual public debt in Greece is stabilized close to its level in 2001 and falls in Ireland
and Spain to a minimum of 5% and 26% of GDP respectively just before the bust. Hence, fiscal policy, once
the fiscal drifts are removed, becomes more conservative but also more countercyclical. This large change
in the public debt in turns reduces spreads during the sudden stop in Greece, Ireland and Spain but very
little in Portugal as shown in figure (21). Lower spreads allow fiscal policy to be less constrained during
the bust which explains part of the increase in debt in the periphery countries in the latest years. The
counterfactual conservative fiscal policy in Greece is successful in stabilizing employment as shown in figure
(22). Remember that this more conservative fiscal policy in Greece also means that this country does not
benefit from the debt relief at the end of the period. The counterfactual conservative fiscal policies in the
boom - which allow for less fiscal austerity in the bust - in Spain and Ireland are less successful in stabilizing
35
employment but allow for an earlier exit from the recession induced by private deleveraging, especially in
Ireland. The counterfactual employment dynamics in Ireland now look very similar to Nevada as illustrated
in figure (1) in the introduction. In both Ireland and Spain, the boom-bust cycle is attenuated, but one
should remember that this entails a large and probably implausible decrease in public debt during the boom,
especially in Ireland. In Portugal, the conservative fiscal policy in the boom has little eﬀect, except at the
end of the cycle where the fall in spreads reduces fiscal austerity and improves employment.
Figure 20: Government Debt under Conservative Fiscal Policy
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Figure 21: Spreads under Conservative Fiscal Policy
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Figure 22: Employment under Conservative Fiscal Policy
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5.2 Counterfactual with macro-prudential policies in the boom
In this counterfactual we imagine that countries were able to implement policies that eliminated the household
leverage boom. We assume that the growth rate of the exogenous part of the private leverage, the part
predicted by the US experience, bˆhj,t, is set to zero in all four countries. This means that private debt is
essentially flat during the whole cycle. We take into account the impact of such policy on the recapitalization
of financial institutions during the bust. Using a cross-sectional regression, we estimate that a reduction
of private debt by one euro during the boom reduces recapitalization needs by 0.25 euro during the bust.
Figure (23) shows that this macro-prudential policy partially stabilizes employment in all four countries.
This is especially so in Ireland: whereas in the data employment falls from peak to trough by 18%, in the
counterfactual it falls by only 7%. Not surprisingly given that there was little private leverage boom in
Portugal the impact of a counterfactual macro-prudential policy is small in this country. The comparison
of the conservative fiscal counterfactual and of the macro-prudential counterfactual shows that the private
leverage boom was the key igniting element of the crisis in Ireland and that fiscal policies during the boom
played a secondary role. The opposite is true for Greece. Given that the fiscal drifts are not aﬀected in
this counterfactual, the fiscal rule (that contains both a spending and transfer drift and a countercyclical
component) induces a larger buildup of public debt than in a situation without macro-prudential policy.
The public debt buildup in the boom can be seen in figure (24). It is especially stark in Spain, Greece and
Ireland. With the spending and transfer drifts unchanged, larger public debt is substituted to private debt
to achieve the employment target. The public debt dynamics appear unsustainable in this counterfactual.
There are two opposite eﬀects on spreads: on the one hand the reduction in private leverage and in predicted
recapitalization reduces spreads. On the other hand, the larger buildup of public debt pushes spreads
upward. In Ireland, the first eﬀect dominates and explains the successful stabilization of employment. In
the other three countries, the two eﬀects cancel each other and spreads are not aﬀected (see figure 26). This
counterfactual suggests that macro-prudential policies that do not come with a more prudent fiscal rule may
not have helped much to generate a fiscally sustainable stabilization of employment. In this sense, macro-
prudential policies to contain private leverage and prudent fiscal policies to contain public debt appear to
be complementary. Indeed, we checked that only a counterfactual that combines prudent fiscal policies and
macro-prudential policies succeeds in stabilizing total debt and employment.
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Figure 23: Employment with Macro-Prudential Policies
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Figure 24: Public debt with Macro-Prudential Policies
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Figure 25: Spreads with Macro-Prudential Policies
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5.3 Counterfactual with “whatever it takes” in 2008
In this counterfactual we ask the following question: what would have happened if the announcements of July
2012 (Mario Draghi’s declaration “Whatever it takes”) and September 2012 (the OMT program) that were
successful in reducing the risk of a euro breakup, the sudden stop and the spreads of the periphery countries
had come earlier. The experiment is to imagine that these actions were implemented and successful in 2008
rather than 2012. We assume that, starting in 2008, σt, the mean of the absolute value of spreads in the
eurozone, that enters the spread equation (18), is kept at its - low- 2007 level. This eﬀectively eliminates the
sudden stop and the dramatic rise in spreads as illustrated in figure (26). This allows to reduce the cost of
borrowing constraint in the fiscal rule so that the countries can avoid fiscal austerity and stabilize employment
(see figure27). The employment dynamics of Ireland and Nevada (see figure 1 in the introduction) look very
similar. Both Nevada and Ireland suﬀer a large private leverage induced boom and bust but then recover
starting in 2011 because both belong to a monetary union that is successful in eliminating the risk of exiting
the dollar and eurozone respectively. Note also that Greece in 2012 still benefits in this counterfactual from
the debt relief, which explains part of the boom in 2012. Finally, because the fiscal drifts remain intact in
this counterfactual, the public debt is not stabilized as illustrated in figure (26) but the larger fiscal receipts
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mean the public debt is not worse than in the data.
There are three channels through which spreads aﬀect aggregate spending in the economy : 1) the savers
spending through their Euler equation (14) ; 2) the leverage of borrowers through equation (17) which in turn
aﬀects their spending; 3) public spending and transfers through the borrowing constraint of governments in
the fiscal rule (19) . Transfers in turn aﬀect the spending of the borrowers. We can use the counterfactual
of spreads to quantify the role of each channel. We take the example of Spain and ask how the diﬀerence
in spreads between the data and the counterfactual aﬀects the diﬀerent components of spending. Taking
into account the leakage of imports, the increase in expenditures by savers is around 0.5 percentage point of
GDP. The increase in private leverage for the borrowers has about the same impact on their spending. Public
spending increases by around 3.6 percentage points of GDP. Transfers also increase by the same amount but
because of import leakage and because only the spending of borrowers reacts to transfers, their impact on
total spending is lower, around 1.5 percentage point of GDP. Hence, around 84% of the increase in aggregate
spending that comes with lower spreads (around 6 percentage point of GDP) is due to the relaxation of
the fiscal constraint by governments. The rest is equally due to the increase in spending by lenders (lower
saving) and borrowers (more borrowing). The preeminence of the fiscal channel is robust across countries.
Figure 26: Spreads with Early ECB Intervention
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Figure 27: Employment with Early ECB Intervention
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Figure 28: Public Debt with Early ECB Intervention
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5.4 Counterfactual with competitiveness measures
In this counterfactual we ask the following hypothetical question: what would have happened if periphery
countries had been able to recoup during the bust the competitiveness they had lost during the boom years.
This is close to a “flexible” exchange rate counterfactual, but it is not identical because it does not impact
the net foreign asset position. It captures the idea of a fiscal devaluation.11
More precisely, we assume in this counterfactual that export prices fall in the bust years (2008 to 2012)
by the amount prices relative to the euro zone increased in the boom years (2002 to 2007).12 Because of unit
elasticity of demand this means that exports increase by the amount of the cumulative increase in prices
relative to the euro zone on the period 2002 to 2007. In the case of Spain and Greece, the competitiveness
shock generates a 7% increase in nominal exports. In the case of Ireland the shock is larger at almost 11%.
It is almost nil for Portugal so that in this country the counterfactual has no eﬀect. The fall in employment
is attenuated in the other three countries as shown in figure (29). This is especially the case in Ireland
where employment rebounds in 2012. Relative to the data, employment is higher in the counterfactual by
7% in Ireland, and around 4% in Spain and Greece. There are several positive eﬀects of the competitiveness
shock. There is a direct eﬀect on aggregate demand. This eﬀect is the most important and is larger in
more open economies such as Ireland. Savers and borrowers also increase their spending. The later because
of increased disposable income and the former because increased foreign demand increases their permanent
nominal income. Income taxes improve and governments react early on to the positive competitiveness shock
by cutting spending and transfers. The trajectory in public debt is therefore improved as shown in figure
(28). This improvement in the debt dynamics is - maybe surprisingly - the quantitatively largest consequence
of the competitiveness shock: in 2012 public debt is lower by 28 percentage points of GDP in Ireland, 16
percentage points of GDP in Spain and and 12 percentage points of GDP in Greece. It also allows for a fall
in spreads especially in Ireland and Spain as shown in figure (30).
11See Franco (2013) and Farhi et al. (2014) for conditions under which a fiscal devaluation is equivalent to an exchange rate
adjustment.
12For Greece, contrary to the other countries, the price increase during the 2002-2007 period is not the observed data on unit
labor costs relative to the euro zone but the price increase predicted by the model. The reason is that the data we have on unit
labor costs in Greece is extremely volatile and clearly contains mistakes.
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Figure 29: Employment with Competitiveness Shock
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Figure 30: Public Debt with Competitiveness Shock
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Figure 31: Spreads with Competitiveness Shock
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6 Conclusion
Understanding the dynamics of the Eurozone is a major challenge for macroeconomics. Eurozone countries
have experienced extraordinary levels of real and financial volatility. Unemployment rates have diverged to
an extent that nobody had anticipated. Financial flows have been extremely volatile and for the first time
in history a major sudden stop materialized in a common currency area. While most observers recognize
that private leverage, fiscal policy and sudden stops all played a role, it has proven challenging to analyze
them jointly, and even more diﬃcult to disentangle them.
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we present a model that accounts at the same time for
domestic credit, fiscal policy, and current account dynamics. Second, we create a data set for 11 countries
over 13 years that covers the variables of interest and deal with the various accounting issues. Third, and
most importantly, we propose a new identification strategy that allows us to run counter-factual experiments
on fiscal policy, macro-prudential policy, ECB policy averting the sudden stop episode and on regaining
competitiveness.
Our experiments enable us to quantify the role of the diﬀerent mechanisms in the euro crisis for Ireland,
Spain, Greece and Portugal. The private leverage boom was the key igniting element of the crisis especially
in Spain and Ireland. Fiscal policy (essentially pro cyclical) during the boom worsened the situation by
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increasing spreads and constraining governments after the private deleveraging started in 2008 and even
more so with the sudden stop episode. This is especially true in Greece and to a lower extent in Spain and
Ireland. In these two countries, a more conservative fiscal policy during the boom would have helped but
would have entailed an implausibly large fall of public debt. Ireland would have had to enter the crisis with
almost no public debt to be able to partially stabilize the private leverage bust after 2008.
A macro-prudential policy to limit private leverage during the boom would have stabilized employment
in all countries, and especially in Ireland. However, in the absence of a more prudent fiscal policy, this
would have induced a larger buildup in public debt. One lesson we take from our exercise is that fiscal and
macro-prudential policies are complements not substitutes in order to stabilize the economy. A prudent fiscal
policy, although helpful, cannot by itself undo the consequences of a private leverage boom and the reverse
is true also. Both prudent fiscal policies and macro-prudential policies are required to stabilize the economy.
The sudden stop episode worsened the crisis by further constraining the fiscal reaction of governments
during the bust. If the ECB words and actions (Mario Draghi’s declaration “Whatever it takes” and the
OMT program) had come earlier and had been successful in reducing the spreads, the four countries would
have been able to avoid the latest part of the slump but would not have avoided the large buildup in public
debt. Finally, the impossibility to devalue and the diﬃculty to regain competitiveness during the bust was
a significant drag on employment in Spain and even more so in Ireland.
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Appendix
A Model
A.1 Scaling
We have already defined the Euler equations for country j and the monetary union (with an asterisk) as a
whole:
Et [Xs,j,t+1] ≈ β (1 + rj,t)Xs,j,t ; Et
[
X∗s,t+1
] ≈ β (1 + r∗s,t)X∗s,t.
and the spread as
1 + ρj,t ≡ 1 + rj,t
1 + r∗s,t
If we scale the budget constraint (assuming perfect foresight, or equivalently, neglecting the conditional
variance of the aggregate shocks), we get
Xs,j,t
X∗s,t
+
Sj,t+1
X∗s,t+1
X∗s,t+1
X∗s,t
1 + rj,t
=
Sj,t
X∗s,t
+
Y˜j,t
X∗s,t
and up to the usual approximation we have
xs,j,t +
β
1 + ρj,t
sj,t+1 = sj,t + y˜j,t
A.2 Phillips Curve (
phj,t
)2
phj,t−1
+ (κN⋆ − 1) phj,t − κYj,t = 0
Defining ∆ ≡ (κN⋆ − 1)2 + 4κ Yj,t
phj,t−1
, we find that
phj,t
phj,t−1
=
1− κN⋆ +√∆
2
Note that if Yj,t
phj,t−1
= n⋆, then ∆ = (κN⋆ + 1)2, and
phj,t
phj,t−1
= 1.
A.3 Budget constraints.
Let us first rewrite the budget constraints and market clearing conditions. Using the market clearing condi-
tion, and competition phj,t = wj,t, we get
yj,t = αj (χjxb,j,t + (1− χj)xs,j,t) + fj,t + gj,t.
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Nominal exports are fj,t, nominal imports are (1− χj) pfj,tcfs,j,t + χjpfj,tcfb,j,t since the government does not
buy imported goods. So net exports are ej,t = fj,t−(1− αj) (χjxb,j,t + (1− χj)xs,j,t) .We define disposable
(after-tax) income as y˜j,t ≡ (1− τj,t) yj,t + zj,t.
We can then write the system for nominal variables
• xb,j,t = b
h
j,t+1
1+rj,t
+ y˜j,t − bhj,t, budget constraint of impatient agents
• xs,j,t = sj,t + y˜j,t − sj,t+11+rj,t , budget constraint of patient agents
• yj,t = αj (χjxb,j,t + (1− χj)xs,j,t) + fj,t + gj,t, market clearing
• gj,t + zj,t − τj,tyj,t = b
g
j,t+1
1+rj,t
− bgj,t, budget constraint of the government
• ej,t = 1αj (fj,t − (1− αj) (yj,t − gj,t)), definition of net exports
Combining the first four equations, we get market clearing at time t:
(1− αj) y˜j,t = αjχj
(
bhj,t+1
1 + rj,t
− bhj,t
)
+ αj (1− χj)
(
sj,t − sj,t+1
1 + rj,t
)
+
bgj,t+1
1 + rj,t
− bgj,t + fj,t. (22)
It will often be useful to obtain a recursive equation for nominal GDP. Taking the first diﬀerence of (22) we
get
(1− αj)∆ [y˜j,t] = χjαj
(
β∆
[
bhj,t+1
1 + ρj,t
]
−∆ [bhj,t]
)
− (1− χj)αj
(
β∆
[
sj,t+1
1 + ρj,t
]
−∆ [sj,t]
)
+β∆
[
bgj,t+1
1 + ρj,t
]
−∆ [bgj,t]+∆ [fj,t]
A.4 Pseudo-Steady State
We consider a steady state with constant interest rates equal to the rate of time preference of savers, i.e.
β (1 + r) = 1 and the spread is zero: ρ = 0. The borrowing limit bhj is exogenous and we consider equilibria
where the borrowing constraint (3) binds. Our notion of steady state is complicated by the fact that savings
sj,t are history-dependent. We define a steady state as the long run equilibrium of an economy with initial
savings sj and government debt b
g
j , subject to no further shocks, constant government spending and constant
government debt. All nominal quantities are constant and employment is at its natural rate n⋆.13 The long-
run equilibrium conditions are
phjn
⋆ = χjαjxb,j + (1− χj)αjxs,j + f + gj
xb,j = y˜j − r1 + r b
h
j
xs,j = y˜j +
r
1 + r
sj
τjp
h
jn
⋆ = gj + zj +
r
1 + r
bgj
13We consider here the case where labor supply is inelastic, so n⋆ is eﬀectively exogenous.
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Nominal output (the price of home goods) is pinned down by
phj n
⋆ = αj
(
(1− τj) phj n⋆ + zj
)
+ αj
r
1 + r
(
(1− χj) sj − χj b¯j
)
+ fj + gj .
There are several ways to specify government policy. Here we assume that the policy is to keep government
debt and nominal spending gj constant. Long run nominal output is then given by
phj n
⋆ =
αj
1− αj raj +
fj
1− αj + gj (23)
where recall that we have defined a as net foreign assets. This equation shows the determinants of the long
run price level. The long run price level depends on the exogenous components of spending: net asset income,
foreign demand, and government spending. All these are inflationary. For a given tax rate τj , transfers are
then chosen to satisfy the government’s budget constraint:
zj = τjp
h
jn
⋆ − gj − r
1 + r
bgj .
A.5 Euler Equation and Expected Income
The Euler equation of savers is
1
xs,j,t
= (1 + ρj,t)Et
[
1
xs,j,t+1
]
.
and we use the linear approximation
Et [xs,j,t+1] = (1 + ρj,t)xs,j,t.
Consider the following experiment. Savers enter the period with a given level of savings. Then there is a
shock to interest rates. For instance, starting from a steady state where ρ = 0, if the new rate is such that
ρ > 0, savings jumps up, and if the new rate is such that ρ < 0, spending jumps up. The budget constraint
at time t is
xs,j,t = sj,t + y˜j,t − sj,t+1
1 + ρj,t
and the expected budget constraint at time t+ 1 is
Et
[
sj,t+2
1 + ρj,t+1
]
= sj,t+1 + Et [y˜j,t+1 − xs,j,t+1] .
Combining the budget constraints and the linearized Euler equation, we get
(1 + β)sj,t+1 + Et [y˜j,t+1]− βEt
[
sj,t+2
1 + ρj,t+1
]
= (1 + ρj,t) (sj,t + y˜j,t) . (24)
since on average β(1 + r) = 1.
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A.6 Equilibrium Conditions of the Model
Detrending and assuming that rates are the same within a country, we have:
• 1
xs,j,t
= (1 + ρj,t)Et
[
1
xs,j,t+1
]
, Euler equation
• xb,j,t = b
h
j,t+1
1+rj,t
+ y˜j,t − bhj,t, budget constraint of impatient agents
• xs,j,t = sj,t + y˜j,t − β sj,t+11+ρj,t , budget constraint of patient agents
• yj,t = αj (χjxb,j,t + (1− χj)xs,j,t) + fj,t + gj,t, market clearing
• gj,t + zj,t − τj,tyj,t = β b
g
j,t+1
1+ρj,t
− bgj,t, budget constraint of the government
• ej,t = 1αj (fj,t − (1− αj) (yj,t − gj,t)), net exports
• y˜j,t = (1− τj) yj,t + zj,t, disposable income
• (1− αj) y˜j,t = αjχj
(
β
bhj,t+1
1+ρj,t
− bhj,t
)
+αj (1− χj)
(
sj,t − β sj,t+11+ρj,t
)
+β
bgj,t+1
1+ρj,t
−bgj,t+fj,t, market clearing
• nj,t = yj,tphj,t , labor market
• p
h
j,t−p
h
j,t−1
phj,t−1
= κ (nj,t − n⋆), inflation
A.7 Proof of Lemma 1
Savers solve
max
∑
t≥0 β
t log (Xs,j,t)
Xs,j,t +
Sj,t+1
1+rj,t
= Sj,t + Y˜j,t
Let us integrate forward the budget constraint:
K∑
k=0
Xs,j,t+k
Rj,t,k
+
Sj,t+K+1
Rj,t,K+1
= Sj,t +
K∑
k=0
Y˜j,t+k
Rj,t,k
.
where the k-period ahead discount rate for k ≥ 1 from the savers’ perspective
Rj,t,k ≡ (1 + rj,t) .. (1 + rs,j,t+k−1) ,
and the convention Rj,t,0 = 1. The next step is to use the resource constraint
(1− αj) Y˜j,t = αjχj
(
Bhj,t+1
1 + rj,t
−Bhj,t
)
− αj (1− χj)
(
Sj,t+1
1 + rj,t
− Sj,t
)
+ Fj,t +
Bgj,t+1
1 + rj,t
−Bgj,t
Summing and rearranging the terms, we get
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(1− αj)
(
Y˜j,t +
Y˜j,t+1
Rj,t,1
)
= αjχj
(
1
Rj,t,1
Bhj,t+2
1 + rj,t+1
−Bhj,t
)
−αj (1− χj)
(
−Sj,t + 1
Rj,t,1
Sj,t+2
1 + rj,t+1
)
+ Fj,t +
Fj,t+1
Rj,t,1
+
1
Rj,t,1
Bgj,t+2
1 + rj,t+1
−Bgj,t
to write:
(1− αj)
(
Y˜j,t +
Y˜j,t+1
Rj,t,1
+
Y˜j,t+2
Rj,t,2
)
= −αjχj
(
Bhj,t −
1
Rj,t,2
Bhj,t+3
1 + rj,t+2
)
+αj (1− χj)
(
Sj,t − Sj,t+3
Rj,t,3
)
+ Fj,t +
Fj,t+1
Rj,t,1
+
Fj,t+2
Rj,t,2
−Bgj,t +
1
Rj,t,2
Bgj,t+3
1 + rj,t+2
Therefore for a generic horizon K
K∑
k=0
(1− αj) Y˜j,t+k
Rj,t,k−1
= αj
(
(1− χj)Sj,t − χjBhj,t
)−Bgj,t + K∑
k=0
Fj,t+k
Rj,t,k
− (1− χj)αj Sj,t+K+1
Rj,t,K+1
+
1
Rj,t,K
(
αjχjBhj,t+K+1
1 + rj,t+K
+
Bgj,t+K+1
1 + rj,t+K
)
We take the limit and we impose a No-Ponzi condition
lim
K→∞
Et
[
Sj,t+K+1
Rj,t,K+1
]
= 0
lim
K→∞
Et
[
1
Rj,t,K
Bhj,t+K+1
1 + rj,t+K
]
= 0
lim
K→∞
Et
[
1
Rj,t,K
Bgj,t+K+1
1 + rj,t+K
]
= 0
The inter-temporal current account condition is
(1− αj)Et
∞∑
k=0
Y˜j,t+k
Rj,t,k
= αj (1− χj)Sj,t − αjχjBhj,t −Bgj,t + Et
∞∑
k=0
Fj,t+k
Rj,t,k
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The inter-temporal budget constraint is then
(1− αj)Et
∞∑
k=0
Xs,j,t+k
Rj,t,k
= (1− αjχj)Sj,t − χjαjBhj,t −Bgj,t + Et
∞∑
k=0
Fj,t+k
Rj,t,k
The net present value of savers’ spending depends on beginning of period net foreign assets (1− αjχj)Sj,t−
χjαjBhj,t −Bgj,t and the net present value of exports.
A.8 Impulse Response Function
To compute the impulse response functions of the model we need to make an assumption about the path of
household debt and fiscal policy
Assumptions A2.
• Shocks on borrowing constraints are such that Et
[
bhj,t+2
]
= bhj,t+1,
• Fiscal policy is such that Et
[
bgj,t+2
]
= bgj,t+1 and the tax rate τj is constant.
• The variance of interest rates and foreign demand is small, and βb is small enough that bj,t = bhj,t at
all times;
Assumptions A2 is only necessary to solve for the entire path of macroeconomic variables shown in the
impulse response functions. The first condition says that shocks on borrowing are permanent. The second
defines a class of fiscal policies. The last point is purely technical. It allows us to linearize Euler equations.
We assume that the shocks are small enough that impatient households find it optimal to borrow up to the
constraint (this is a joint restriction on the discount factor and the size of the shocks). Note that A2 is not
necessary for the reduced form and structural simulations.
We now look for decision rules for the savers {sj,t}t=1,2... and the other variables of the model, yj,t, phj,t,
etc. We get the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. Under A1 and A2, savings dynamics satisfy Et [sj,t+2] = sj,t+1.
Proof. With assumptions A1 (Et [fj,t+1] = fj,t and Et [ρj,t+1] = 0), we guess and verify that the Lemma is
correct. Suppose the Lemma is true, then we obtain two important equations. Equation (24) becomes
sj,t+1 = (1 + ρj,t) (sj,t + y˜j,t)− Et [y˜j,t+1] , (25)
and expected market clearing at t+ 1 is
(1− αj)Et [y˜j,t+1] = (1− β)
(
αj (1− χj) sj,t+1 − αjχbhj,t+1 − bgj,t+1
)
+ fj,t. (26)
Therefore
(1− αj) sj,t+1 = (1− αj) (1 + ρj,t) (sj,t + y˜j,t)− (1− β)
(
αj (1− χj) sj,t+1 − αjχbhj,t+1 − bgj,t+1
)− fj,t
1− αj .
Using market clearing at time t we get
sj,t+1
1 + ρj,t
− sj,t = αjχj
1− αjχj
(
bhj,t+1
1 + ρj,t
− bhj,t
)
+
1
1− αjχj
(
bgj,t+1
1 + ρj,t
− bgj,t +
ρj,t
1 + ρj,t
fj,t
1− αj
)
(27)
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Savings inherit the dynamic properties of bhj,t and b
g
j,t. Since we assume small shocks and Et [ρj,t+1] = 0, this
validates our conjecture that Et [sj,t+2] = sj,t+1.
Equilibrium conditions The five equilibrium conditions of the model are
1. sj,t+1 = (1 + ρj,t) (sj,t + y˜j,t)− Et [y˜j,t+1]
2. (1− αj)Et [y˜j,t+1] = (1− β)
(
αj (1− χj) sj,t+1 − αjχjbhj,t+1 − bgj,t+1
)
+ fj,t.
3. (1− αj) y˜j,t = αjχj
(
bhj,t+1
1+rj,t
− bhj,t
)
+ αj (1− χj)
(
sj,t − sj,t+11+rj,t
)
+
bgj,t+1
1+rj,t
− bgj,t + fj,t.
4. gj,t + zj,t − τjyj,t = b
g
j,t+1
1+rj,t
− bgj,t
5. y˜j,t = (1− τj) yj,t + zj,t
The five unknown endogenous variables are y˜j,t, yj,t, b
g
j,t, sj,t+1, and Et [y˜j,t+1]. The exogenous shocks are
bhj,t, fj,t and ρj,t. The policy shocks variables are transfers and public expenditure, zj,t and gj,t respectively.
The state space of predetermined endogenous variables is sj,t and b
g
j,t.
We need to specify the policy function of the government in order to compute the impulse responses.
We are interested in simple rules that deliver the property that the public debt follows a random walk:
Et
[
bgj,t+2
]
= bgj,t+1 and deliver some automatic stabilization, characteristic of modern fiscal systems in all
OECD countries (see Fatas and Mihov (2012)). We assume that spending and transfers are predetermined.
From the government budget constraint, this means that a recession at time t automatically increases gov-
ernment debt at time t. To maintain fiscal stability, we specify that transfers adjust from t to t+ 1 to keep
public debt constant thereafter: Et
[
bgj,t+2
]
= bgj,t+1. More precisely, we specify the general policy rule as
follows
1. Fiscal variables phj,tgj,t and zj,t are pre-determined. Government debt b
g
j,t is determined in equilibrium
at time t.
2. Set transfers zj,t+1 for next period so that Et
[
bgj,t+2
]
= bgj,t+1 assuming a martingale for p
h
j,tgj,t.
(a) The expected budget constraint is
τjEt [yj,t+1] = gj,t + zj,t+1 +
r
1 + r
bgj,t+1
(b) By definition we have
Et [y˜j,t+1] = (1− τj)Et [yj,t+1] + zj,t+1
(c) Therefore (recall that Et [y˜j,t+1] is part of our solution at time t), zj,t+1 is given by
zj,t+1 = τjEt [y˜j,t+1]− (1− τj) gj,t − (1− τj) r
1 + r
bgj,t+1
B Data & Calibration
B.1 Data sources
B.1.1 Europe
All economic data for Eurozone countries (employment, population, GDP, consumption, government debt,
expenditures...) comes from Eurostat. We use data for 11 eurozone countries from 2000 to 2012. Austria,
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Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal. We excluded
Luxembourg for which household debt data is available only starting in 2005 and other countries that joined
in 2007 and later.
The data on household debt comes from the BIS which itself compiled the data from national central
banks. This is debt of household and non-profit institutions serving households. Credit covers all loans and
debt securities and comes from both domestic and foreign lenders. The series have quarterly frequency and
capture the outstanding amount of credit at the end of the reference quarter.
We call government expenditures total government expenditures net of transfers, interest payments and
bank recapitalization. The data on spending on bank recapitalization comes from Eurostat. It includes
interest payable, capital injections recorded as deficit-increasing (capital transfer) and calls on guarantees
and is net of revenues generated by bank recapitalization (guarantee fees, interest and dividends). Transfers
is the addition of direct social benefits and of social transfers in kind.
The data on interest rates (10 year government bonds) come from the ECB. The spread is defined as the
diﬀerence of the 10 year interest rate on government bonds with the median of the euro zone.
For exports we measure the domestic value added that is associated with final consumption in the rest
of the world, which corresponds to value added based exports. We use the data from the OECD-WTO
Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) initiative to measure domestic value added embodied in gross exports. Data
is available only in 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2009. For missing years, we use the ratio of gross exports (from
Eurostat) to value added gross exports of the nearest year and multiply this ratio by the gross exports of
the missing year to obtain an approximation of value added exports of the missing years.
We use annual averages of 10 year government bond rates as long term rates. The source is OECD.
B.1.2 United States
Data for the United States comes from the BEA, the Flow of Funds (FoF), and from the FRBNY Consumer
Credit Panel. BEA and FoF data are standard and widely used so we do not discuss them.
The FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel is described in Lee and van der Klaauw (2012). It is a new longitu-
dinal database with detailed information on consumer debt and credit. This panel is a random sample from
consumer credit reports. It is available from 1999 onwards. Credit reporting agencies compile and maintain
credit histories for all U.S. residents who have applied for or taken out a loan. Credit bureaus continuously
collect information on individual consumers’ debt and credit from lenders and creditors. Most individuals
begin building a credit history when they first obtain and use a credit or retail card or take out a student
loan, usually when they are at least 18 years of age. New immigrants with little or no credit history from
their home country are often older when a credit file is first created for them. The sample design implies
that the target population consists of all US residents with a credit history. In addition to most individu-
als younger than 18, who had little need or opportunity for credit activity, the target population excludes
individuals who have never applied for or qualified for a loan.
The data at the State level is available in three data sets on the FRBNY web site:
• State level data for all States from 1999 to 2012, annual data for Q4 only.
• Selected states from 1999 to 2003, quarterly data.
• Selected states from 2003 to 2014, quarterly data.
Lee and van der Klaauw (2012) argue that household debt estimates based on the FRBNY Consumer Credit
Panel are similar to estimates reported in the Board of Governors’ Flow of Funds Accounts. There are
diﬀerences, however. First, the household debt measures in the Flow of Funds are not based on direct data
but instead are derived as residual amounts. Total mortgage debt and non-mortgage debt in the second
quarter of 2010 were respectively $9.4 and $2.3 trillion, the comparable amounts in the FoF for the same
quarter were $10.2 and $2.4 trillion, respectively.
Second, the FoF measure of household mortgage debt includes some mortgage debt held by nonprofit
organizations (churches, universities, etc.). On the other hand, FRBNY estimates exclude some debt held
by individuals without social security numbers. There may also be diﬀerences in the speed at which changes
in various types of debt are recorded, where new mortgage accounts usually appear on credit reports with
some delay, making some direct comparisons diﬃcult. The comparison is shown in figure (32).
B.2 Scaled data
In order to map the observed data into the model we scale the data in a manner consistent with equation (13)
in the model. We construct a benchmark level of nominal GDP for each country and year: it is the nominal
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Figure 32: Comparison of Household Debt Measures
GDP the country would have if it had the same per-capita growth rate as the whole eurozone aggregate
expenditure level and its actual population growth. Define
• Yj,t: nominal GDP in euros of country j,
• X∗t : aggregate expenditures for the Eurozone
• Nj,t: population of country j, and N¯t for the Eurozone
• Benchmark nominal GDP for countryj at timet:
Yˆj,t ≡ Yj,0X
∗
t
X∗0
Nj,t/N¯t
Nj,0/N¯0
We have experimented with two definitions of Y¯t/Y¯0: one is actual nominal GDP, the other is the trend
nominal growth before and after the crisis (starting in 2008 this benchmark growth rate is the average of
the eurozone crisis, around 1%). Then we define the scaled nominal GDP as
yj,t ≡ Yj,t
Yˆj,t
We compute scaled series for private and public spending by scaling by the benchmark nominal GDP. For
unit labor costs, we scale by the average unit labor cost in the eurozone. For employment per capita, we
take the deviation with respect to 2002 with an index of 1 for that year. We define the scaled level as the
ratio of debt to the benchmark levels of nominal GDP:
bgj,t ≡
Bgj,t
Yˆj,t
.
Finally, when we map to our model, we must remember that we define bj,t as per capita debt, so in fact we
have
χjbj,t ≡ Bj,t
Yˆj,t
57
The scaled data for the reduced form shocks for household and public debt, government expenditures and
transfers, spreads and foreign demand are given in figures (33), (34), (36) and (35).
Figure 33: Household and public debt
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Figure 34: Government expenditures and transfers
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Figure 35: Value added based exports
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Figure 36: Spreads (10 year government bonds)
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B.3 Simulation of the reduced form and structural models
To simulate the reduced form model and compare model outputs to realized data, we use as inputs to the
model annual data on household debt, government spending and transfers, government debt14 and interest
rates for the simulation period 2001-2012. The level of output, the price level and the level of net foreign
assets is set to their 2002 levels in the data. Foreign demand is set using data on exports in value added
terms for 2001-2012, normalized so that the level of foreign demand in 2002 satisfies goods market clearing
in the model. Finally, taxes are set so that the path for government debt implied by the model coincides
exactly with the data.
The structural model is simulated in the same way but the exogenous variables are replaced by structural
equations (17) and (18) for private debt and spreads respectively and the fiscal policy rule (19). The tax rate
is constant at its 2002 level and equal to total government revenues as a percentage of GDP. The structural
shocks are now bˆhj,t, σt and g˜j,t.
14Instead of using government debt directly from data, we construct a simulated government debt series in order to avoid
including factors that aﬀect government debt in the data but are not in the model, such as bank recapitalizations, default, rev-
enues from privatizations, etc. The simulated debt series is constructed by adding to t−1 period debt government expenditures
including interest payments and subtracting tax revenues.
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